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Abstract: It has often been argued during the recent credit crisis that commercial banks’ 
involvement in investment banking activities might have had an impact on the intensity of their 
underwriting standards. We turn to evidence from the period prior to the complete revocation of 
the Glass-Steagall Act in the United States and analyze whether investment banks or – section 
20 subsidiaries of – commercial banks underwrote riskier securities. We compare actual defaults 
of these deals for an extensive sample of about 4,000 corporate debt securities underwritten 
during the period of the de facto softening of the Act’s restrictions. Securities underwritten by 
commercial banks’ subsidiaries have a higher probability of default than those underwritten by 
investment houses. This evidence is stronger in the case of ex-ante riskier and more competitive 
issues, and during the first years of bank securities’ subsidiaries’ entry into the market. Based on 
our results, it is not possible to reject that the repeal of the Glass-Steagall led to looser credit 
screening by broad (universal) banking companies trying to gain market share and/or to the 
lower initial ability of these banks to correctly evaluate default risk. 
 
Keywords: Glass-Steagall Act, securities underwriting, default, investment banking.  


















Over the last 30 years there has been a profound deregulation of investment banks’ activities in 
the United States which lead to the creation of large financial institutions with a wide range of 
banking business. One of the most notorious examples of regulation setting up restrictions on 
banks’ business models was the banking Act of 1933, commonly known as the Glass-Steagall 
Act, which imposed a functional separation between commercial and securities activities. At the 
time, the enactment of the Glass-Steagall was to a large extent motivated by concerns about 
conflicts of interest between the lending, underwriting and proprietary trading functions.  
In the last decades of its existence the Glass-Steagall was progressively relaxed. In April 1987 
the Fed allowed US commercial bank holding companies to establish affiliates which authorized 
to underwrite certain corporate securities. Finally, in 1999, the Glass-Steagall Act was formally 
repealed. 
The dismantling of the Glass-Steagall Act was based on three main arguments. First, its 
revocation would allow banks to attain favorable economies of scope. Second, it would help 
banks to achieve greater opportunities for diversification derived from the different business 
lines with heterogeneous revenue cycles. Third, the repeal of the constraints introduced by the 
Glass-Steagall Act was expected to enhance the ability of US financial institutions to compete 
with foreign universal banks.  
The rescission of the Glass-Steagall prohibitions was also buttressed by increasingly persuasive 
evidence from academic studies of the impact of broad banking on the pre-Glass-Steagall era. 
They consistently showed that securities underwritten by commercial banks’ subsidiaries did 
not have a higher probability of default than those underwritten by investment banks.  
We revisit the issue and present new empirical evidence on the impact of banks’ business 
models on credit screening of corporate bonds. We examine empirically about 4,000 corporate 
bonds underwritten by investment houses and commercial banks’ subsidiaries during the period 
of the progressive repeal of the Glass-Steagall (between 1991 and 1999) in the United States 
and analyze their ex-post credit quality using a unique data base of corporate defaults running 
until the end of 2008.  
We find that over the ten years of the progressive repeal of the Act, debt securities issues 
underwritten by commercial banks had a higher probability of default than those underwritten 
by investment houses, the more so in the case of ex-ante riskier and more competitive issues, 
and during the first years of bank subsidiaries entry into the market. Based on our results, it is 
not possible to reject that the repeal of the Glass-Steagall led to looser credit screening by broad 
(universal) banking companies, although this seems to be due to banks’ relative more aggressive 
underwriting standards in order to gain market share and/or the lower initial ability of these 
banks to correctly evaluate default risk rather than to conflicts of interest between the lending 
and underwriting functions. Our results do not question the elimination of the barriers between 
investment and commercial banking proposed by the Glass-Steagall Act. Rather, they point to 
the possibly perverse effects of allowing for increased competition without complementing it 
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I.  Introduction 
Over the last 30 years there has been a historical liberalization of banking markets in the United 
States. This liberalization included a “de facto” profound deregulation of investment banks’ 
activities which lead to the creation of large financial institutions with a wide range of banking 
business. While there have been a number of drivers of the financial crisis,
1 there has been a 
renewed interest – mostly from a financial stability perspective – on reassessing the usefulness 
of regulations imposing a functional separation between commercial and investment banking 
activities.  
One of the most notorious examples of this regulation is the banking Act of 1933, 
commonly known as the Glass-Steagall Act, which abolished the securities affiliates of 
commercial banks (henceforth denoted as “banks” or “commercial banks” as opposed to 
“investment houses”) and imposed a separation or “firewall” between commercial and securities 
activities. At the time, the enactment of the Glass-Steagall was to a large extent motivated by 
concerns about the role of banks in the run up to the great depression and in particular about 
conflicts of interest between different banking activities and, in particular, between the lending, 
underwriting and proprietary trading functions.
2    
In the last decades of its existence the Act was progressively relaxed. In April 1987 the 
Fed allowed US bank holding companies to establish affiliates which authorized to underwrite 
certain corporate securities. Finally, in 1999, the Glass-Steagall Act was formally repealed with 
the passing and enactment of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999. At the time, three main 
arguments were put forward the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act (Santos, 1998; Barth et al., 
2000).  
First, it would allow banks to attain favorable economies of scope. That is, for banks 
certain fixed costs of collecting, processing and assessing information or distributing financial 
services can be used across a range of financial services. These economies of scope were 
expected to enable financial holding companies to earn higher profits and pass along lower 
prices and to offer more product and service choices to their customers. In this respect, Kanatas 
and Qi (1997) analyze the trade-offs between the benefits derived from scope economies and the 
possible conflicts of interest and show that if commercial banks are allowed to underwrite 
securities, their economies of scope may enable them to gain all of the underwriting business of 
their loan customers by lowering credit standards.  
Second, the dismantling of the Act was expected to allow banks to achieve lower levels 
of risk due to greater opportunities. These diversification opportunities for diversification 
                                                           
1 They include, more prominently, financial innovation, the degree of competition in the banking system, external 
financial imbalances, the level of private sector debt, corporate governance in the banking sector, the relative 
tightness of monetary policy and the intensity of banking supervision among others (Acharya and Richardson, 2009). 
2 The separation of commercial and securities business was not a new idea. In fact it was the norm in many countries 
and had been American law and custom until the turn of the twentieth century, when securities affiliates of deposit 
taking institutions were allowed to operate (Mayer, 2009, and Gerschenkron, 1962). 7
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derived from the different business lines with different revenues cycles were expected to 
translate in a lower profit variance for a broad banking company than for more specialized 
institutions (Cornett et al., 2002). Third, the repeal of the constraints introduced by the Glass-
Steagall Act was expected to enhance US financial institutions’ ability to compete with foreign 
universal banks.
3 
The repeal of the Glass-Steagall prohibitions was also supported by the increasingly 
persuasive evidence from academic studies of the impact of broad banking on the pre-Glass-
Steagall era (Barth et al., 2000). Most empirical studies used data from the 1920s in the US (i.e. 
the pre-Glass-Steagall era) and showed that issues underwritten by the securities’ subsidiaries of 
commercial banks did not have a higher probability of default than those underwritten by 
investment houses (Puri, 1994; Kroszner and Rajan, 1994).
4 In addition, securities underwritten 
by commercial bank subsidiaries at the time paid lower spreads, suggesting that investors 
recognized the stronger certification ability of commercial banks (Puri, 1996). Clearly, until 
very recently, the existence of the Glass-Steagall Act rendered it impossible to conduct a 
research on contemporary US firms using actual information on securities’ defaults. This is the 
object of our research. 
The role of banks’ business models and their possible impact on the intensity of credit 
screening has become again a widely debated issue during the recent credit crisis. As a result, 10 
years after the final repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act the separation between commercial banks 
and securities business is back into the political agenda.
5 A notorious, although very partial, 
reminiscent of the Glass-Steagall Act has been the so called “Volcker Rule”, which was 
included in the Do Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act signed into 
law by President Barack Obama on July 21, 2010. 
We revisit the issue and present new empirical evidence on the impact of the functional 
separation of banks’ business model on credit screening of corporate bonds. We examine 3,943 
corporate bond issues underwritten by investment houses or commercial banks’ subsidiaries 
during the period of the progressive repeal of the Glass-Steagall (between 1991 and 1999) and 
analyze their quality using a unique data base of corporate defaults running until the end of 
2008. We find that debt security issues underwritten by commercial banks had a higher 
probability of default than those underwritten by investment houses.  
Our results are in contrast with the so called “certification hypothesis”, positing that 
commercial banks can benefit from informational economies of scope and therefore are in a 
                                                           
3 This argument was often and empathically put forward politically (see Wilmarth, 2009).  
4 During the Nineties, a number of studies compared the characteristics of securities underwritten by commercial and 
by investment banks, respectively. A brief discussion is presented in section 2; a richer survey is in Crockett et al. 
(2003) and Morrison (2009). 
5 See for instance Senators’ Cantwell and McCain legal initiative to reinstate the Glass-Steagall separation, which 
echoed proposals by senator Hinchey of New York as well as Exchange Commission ex-chairman Arthur Levitt (“An 
Odd Post-Crash Couple Spurning Obama, McCain and Cantwell propose resurrecting Glass-Steagall to break up Wall 
Street”, Newsweek, 15th December, 2009).  8
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better position than investment houses to correctly evaluate the securities that they underwrite. 
  We test two alternative explanations of our findings. First, based on the very rationale 
for the Glass-Steagall Act, we verify if they might be due to the presence of conflicts of interest 
derived from engaging simultaneously in lending and underwriting functions. Second, the pro-
competitive effects of opening-up the security underwriting business and we analyze if 
commercial banks might have relatively lowered the underwriting standards and/or 
underestimated the securities’ default risk, in their search for market share. We call the first the 
“conflicts of interest” hypothesis and the second the “risk underestimation” hypothesis.
6  
Our analysis points towards the second explanation. Securities issues underwritten by 
commercial banks have a higher probability of default particularly if they are ex-ante more 
opaque and riskier, if they are more competitive (i.e., if during the sample period the issuers 
used both banks and investment houses as underwriters; Kang and Liu, 2007), and if they are 
issued during the first part of our sample period. This is consistent with the hypothesis that the 
higher default rate was probably due to an underestimation of default risk on more opaque and 
contested issues, by part of new entrants into the market relatively lowering underwriting 
standards. In line with previous literature (Puri, 1996), we find instead very weak evidence 
consistent with the “conflict of interests” hypothesis. Our results do not question the elimination 
Rather, they point to the possibly perverse effects of allowing for increased competition without 
complementing it with more intensive scrutiny at the banking supervisory level. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the institutional 
environment in the U.S. market for corporate securities underwriting since the introduction of 
Section 20 subsidiaries. Section 3 briefly surveys the relevant literature. Section 4 describes the 
data used in the empirical analysis and presents some preliminary evidence based on the 
descriptive statistics. Sections 5 and 6 present the results of the econometric analysis. Section 7 
concludes. 
 
II.  The institutional framework 
The separation of commercial and investment banking (also called security business) activities 
has been the norm and custom in United States until the turn of the twentieth century. On the 
back of the stock market boom of the 1920s, commercial banks swarmed into the securities 
underwriting business. The McFadden Act in 1927 expressly allowed securities departments of 
national banks to underwrite securities (Peach, 1941). Prior to that, national banks were, in 
                                                           
6 Conflicts of interest in the financial sector arise when a party to a transaction can gain by taking actions which are 
detrimental to its counterparty (see, Mehran and Stultz, 2007, and Crockett et al., 2003). The risk underestimation 
hypothesis is consistent, but not directly applicable, with theories suggesting that strategic interaction among 
asymmetrically informed banks may them to behave more aggressively and loose lending standards (Rajan, 1994, 
Ruckes, 2004, Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2006, and Gorton and He, 2008). 
of the barriers between investment and commercial banking proposed by the Glass-Steagall Act. 9
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principle, barred from entering into the securities business. Yet in practice national banks were 
able to operate in the securities business by creating affiliates.
7 As a result, by 1929 these 
affiliates had attained half of the underwriting business in the United States.  
The public outcry about the possible role of banks in the stock market crash of 1929 
produced concerns about mixing investment and commercial banking activities.
8 This mood 
against the involvement of banks in securities business led to a Senate Banking and Currency 
Committee inquiry known as the Pecora committee, to ascertain conflicts of interest in the 
banking industry. The results showed indication of abuses by banks’ securities affiliates and 
were cited by advocates of the Glass-Steagall Act, that was then passed in 1933. The Act 
banned banks from underwriting, holding or dealing in corporate securities, either directly or 
indirectly via securities affiliates. In particular, Section 20 of the Act ordered that: “no member 
bank could be affiliated with any corporation, association or business trust engaged principally 
in the issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale, or distribution at wholesale or retail through 
syndicate participation of stocks, bonds, debentures, notes or other securities”.
9  
Economically, one prime example of the possible conflicts of interest when marrying 
securities and commercial banking business is the possibility that universal banks might 
underwrite and push low-quality securities to investors (Morrison, 2009).
10 This would of course 
imply the existence of ‘naive’ investors – using the definition coined by Kroszner and Rajan 
(1994) – who would, in turn, buy these securities. Hence such a distinction between investment 
houses and banks implicitly suggests that they have different clienteles, who may in turn 
deserve different degrees of protection.
11 A problem with this interpretation is that it requires 
that investors are irrational and do not learn from past experience (Puri, 1999). 
Another major argument supporting the functional separation provided by the Glass-
Steagall Act was related to financial stability considerations. Namely, to keep deposit-taking 
institutions with access to the deposit insurance facilities out of activities that might lead to 
higher risk-taking and threaten the stability of the banking system (Freixas et al., 2007). The 
related possibility of facilitating “Too-Big-to-Fail (TBTF) Status” probably also supported the 
separation of business models as proposed by the Glass-Steagall Act. That is, the idea that the 
bankruptcy of certain very large and complex banks would be too harmful to the operation of 
the economy to be allowed to fail. This could exacerbate moral hazard problems possibly 
                                                           
7 The Comptroller of the Currency ruled in 1902 that national banks were not allowed to engage in the securities 
business. Yet many banks were able to circumvent this rule by creating securities affiliates as state banks with their 
own capital, owned by the shareholders of the national bank (Morrison, 2009). 
8 See Willis and Chapman (1934) and Kennedy (1973).  
9 For a careful analysis of the institutional environment in the pre-Glass-Steagall period see Peach (1941), Carosso 
(1970), Kennedy (1971), Kelly (1985a), and Benston (1990). 
10 A contrary thesis is that the banks are better informed than investment houses on the financial conditions of their 
clients and are thus able to provide better certification of the securities that they underwrite. 
11 From this perspective the rationale for banning commercial banks from the underwriting business is in fact to be 
found in the need to protect their clients, who are presumed to be less able to evaluate the quality of the security 
issued. 10
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creating incentives for excessive risk-taking (and/or regulatory capture) from those institutions 
(Mishkin, 2006).  
The last argument in favor of the functional separation is behavioral in nature. It stresses 
the basic incompatibility of bringing commercial banking and investment banking activities 
together, as their incentives are not aligned, due to differences in the type of business 
conducted: investment banking is mostly based on fee-seeking brokerage activities in which 
short-term risk taking is paramount. On the other hand, commercial banking activities mostly 
hinge on maturity transformation of assets based on the long-term credit screening and 
monitoring of borrowers (Bhattacharya and Thakor, 1993). Combining both functions under the 
same institutional umbrella might shorten commercial bankers’ incentives, lowering the 
intensity of screening and the long-term monitoring of borrowers.
12 This problem has probably 
become more acute in recent years as banks and markets have become increasingly integrated 
and co-dependent (Boot and Thakor, 2009). 
13 During this period, US 
investment banks became among the most competitive in the world and the share of financial 
intermediation grew rapidly as financial flows progressively shifted from the balance sheets of 
banks and other credit institutions to the financial markets. Starting in the mid-1960s, however, 
banks went back to the securities business, and eventually gained court authorization to 
underwrite municipal bonds. At the same time they were prevented from operating in most 
investment banking business. 
In April 1987 the Fed allowed US commercial bank holding companies to establish 
affiliates (so-called “Section 20 subsidiaries”) which were authorized to underwrite corporate 
securities. Two years later these affiliates were allowed to underwrite commercial paper and in 
1990 permission was extended to equities. All these activities were allowed as long as they did 
not generate more than 5 per cent of the bank’s total revenues (the ceiling was raised to 10 per 
cent in 1989 and 25 per cent in 1996). Finally, in 1999 the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial 
Services Modernization Act repealed the lingering legal barriers related to banks and investment 
houses’ business separation. 
 
III.  The literature  
The progressive loosening of the Glass-Steagall constraints generated a number of empirical 
studies analyzing the possible benefits of separating banks and investment houses’ activities. 
These studies resorted to the analysis of the underwriting standards in the pre-Glass-Steagall 
era, and scrutinized two main hypotheses. The first one was that securities underwritten by 
                                                           
12  Sheng (2009). For a more detailed analysis of the main arguments see Benston (1990). 
13 The Act impacted substantially on the state of banking sector and its future evolution. For example, in the 
aftermath of the set up, JP Morgan was split into the Morgan Bank and what later became Morgan Stanley.  
Between 1933 and 1963 Glass-Steagall was fully enforced.11
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banks might be riskier because of conflicts of interest between the lending and underwriting 
businesses. Alternatively, securities underwritten by banks could be safer, because commercial 
banks might be better informed on their creditors or simply have better credit assessment 
abilities than investment houses and thus can provide a more credible certification of credit risk. 
The theoretical literature studying the implications of the presence of banks in the 
underwriting business is rather limited. Rajan (2002) argues that universal banks can be in 
conflict with their borrowers’ interests because they can extract rents from their underwriting 
business using the monopoly power coming from their superior information on the borrowers 
and issuers’ quality. Kanatas and Qi (1998) show that high quality issuers may have an 
incentive to be separated from low quality issuers. But since this can only be done using an 
investment house as the underwriter, they can choose to forgo the potential benefits of 
informational economies of scope with the lending services. The optimal choice of a high-
quality issuer depends therefore on the trade-off between the conflicts of interests’ costs and the 
benefits from informational economies of scope. In a later paper, Kanatas and Qi (2003) add 
one further dimension suggesting that universal banks have lower incentives to take their 
creditors directly to the markets and place their securities, and therefore may hamper their use of 
arms-length financing. Finally, Puri (1999) shows that the entry of commercial banks in the 
securities business can cause banks to lower the yields for underwritten securities particularly 
when information collection costs are high.  
The empirical literature on the role of bank in the underwriting business is much richer. 
In a seminal paper, Kroszner and Rajan (1994) study the characteristics of a sample of industrial 
bonds underwritten by affiliates of commercial banks and investment houses in the first quarters 
of the years between 1921 and 1929. They obtain two major findings. First, the bonds originated 
by banks’ affiliates were ex-ante safer (they had better ratings). This suggests that markets were 
probably aware of potential conflicts of interest and responded by imposing a ‘lemons market’ 
discount for banks on more information-intensive issues, forcing them to underwrite mostly the 
safer securities. Second, non-investment-grade bonds underwritten by banks’ affiliates had 
fewer cumulative defaults in the period 1930-1940, both in number and in total value, and 
investment-bank underwritten bonds defaulted earlier in their life than affiliate-originated 
issues. This evidence tells against the thesis that commercial banks undertaking investment 
banking business were systematically defrauding their clients.  
Puri (1994) and Ang and Richardson (1994) refine the analysis of Kroszner and Rajan 
(1994) and strengthen their results. Puri concentrates on the period subsequent to the McFadden 
Act of 1927, which explicitly allowed banks’ affiliates to underwrite corporate securities, 
confirming that banks’-originated issues have a lower probability of default.
14 Using a wider set 
                                                           
14 Kroszner and Rajan (1994) define bond issues as underwritten by commercial banks when any such institution is 
included in the syndicate. Puri (1994) includes only those where the affiliate is sole or lead underwriter.  12
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of risk measures (ex-ante yield, default experience, ex-post market prices of bonds, stock prices 
of issuing companies), Ang and Richardson (1994) confirm issues underwritten by commercial 
banks did not performed worse than those underwritten by investment houses. Puri (1996) 
provides evidence of the commercial banks’ greater certification abilities. Comparing two 
samples of securities underwritten in the pre-Glass-Steagall period, she finds that on average 
those originated by investment houses carry higher yields, confirming that commercial banks’ 
greater certification ability outweighs the ‘lemon’ discount.  
An alternative explanation of Puri’s evidence is that banks have greater market power 
relative to their less sophisticated clientele so that they can place securities at higher prices (i.e. 
lower yields) than investment houses. But this is at odds with Kroszner and Rajan (1997) 
findings’ suggesting that securities issued in the pre-Glass-Steagall period by the internal 
departments of commercial banks – for which the potential conflict of interest is even more 
severe – carry higher interest rates than those underwritten by the commercial banks’ securities’ 
affiliates. By confirming that markets consider an affiliate structure as an effective commitment 
mechanism, this result provides indirect evidence of the market’s ability to discern – and price – 
the possibility of conflicts of interest. 
Studying the Section-20 period, Roten and Mullineaux (2002) find no evidence of 
differences in the yield spreads between bonds underwritten by banks and investment houses 
between 1995 and 1998. However, Gande et al. (1997), show that securities underwritten by 
Section 20 subsidiaries of bank holding companies whose commercial bank affiliate is at the 
same time a lender to the bond issuer (i.e., those for which the potential for conflicts of interest 
is stronger) have lower interest rates, and more markedly so for lower-rated issuers. Moreover, 
commercial banks tend to underwrite smaller issues, offering further indirect confirmation of 
their greater ability to acquire and process information.
15 This result is partly confirmed by 
Saunders and Stover (2004), who find that when the same bank acts as underwriter and credit 
guarantor, interest rate spreads to the issuers are lower than average. Also in this direction, 
Drucker and Puri (2005) show that when an underwriter lends to an issuer around the time of an 
IPO (a practice known as ‘tying’), the firm obtains a discounted interest rate on the loan, and the 
discount is greater for the more information-sensitive (i.e. non-investment-grade issues), which 
is consistent with the certification hypothesis.
16  
Evidence from different markets and countries is more mixed.
17 Hebb and Fraser (2002) 
show evidence of certification effects by commercial banks when studying the Canadian 
                                                           
15 Gande et al. (1999) provide further evidence on the effects of the entry of Section 20 subsidiaries in the security 
underwriting market, showing that they have favored the reduction of underwriter spreads and ex-ante yields, and 
proportionally more so for lower-rated and smaller issues. 
16 A related issue is studied by Narayanan et al. (2004), who show that, in order to signal that they are not willing to 
exploit potential conflicts of interest to their advantage, banks acting as underwriters to their clients predominantly 
co-manage with a high reputation non-lending institution. 
17 A parallel strand of literature has studied the effects of the introduction mixing commercial and investment banking 
on bank risk and profitability (Morrison, 2009, and Drucker and Puri, 2007).  13
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corporate bond market. Consistent with the US results, they show that yields on issues 
underwritten by Canadian commercial bank affiliates are lower than those on issues originated 
by independent investment banks. Also in this direction, Konishi (2002) finds no differences in 
the initial yields in bonds underwritten by commercial banks and investment houses in Japan, 
but finds lower default rates for the former.
18  
Evidence consistent with the prevalence of certification over conflicts of interest comes 
also from IPO underwritings. Schenone (2004) and Benzoni and Schenone (2010) show that 
IPOs underwritten by relationship banks are relatively less underpriced, confirming that they are 
not perceived as riskier than those underwritten by banks that have no lending relationships with 
the issuer. Similarly, studying a sample of over 2,000 seasoned equity issues in the US market 
between 1998 and 2006, Duarte-Silva (2010) finds that those underwritten by a lending-
relationship bank had systematically higher announcement returns. In contrast, Ber et al. (2001), 
studying the Israeli market, find that issuing firms whose equity was underwritten by a 
commercial bank affiliate had worse stock market performance but better accounting 
profitability, which suggest the existence of both a certification effect from commercial banks as 
well as the existence of “naïve investors”.  
Finally, a recent paper by Kang and Liu (2007) takes a rather different perspective, 
showing that banks may have conflicts of interest with the issuers, rather than with the 
investors. Focusing on Japan between 1995 and 1997 – after Financial System Reform Act of 
1993 allowed banks to provide investment banking services – they find evidence strongly 
supportive of the hypothesis that banks with stronger relationships with their clients used their 
market power in the lending business to force the issuers to pay higher yields on their securities, 
so as to attract a larger number of investor and gain market shares in the underwriting business, 
a result consistent with the theoretical framework of Rajan (2002). 
We analyze the ex-post default rates of securities underwritten by banks and investment 
houses in the post-Glass-Steagall period. Namely in the following, we assess the impact of the 
repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act on underwriting standards by investment houses compared to 
banks undertaking investment banking business. 
 
IV.  Data and summary statistics 
We analyze all nonconvertible fixed-rate corporate bonds issued in the United States between 
January 1, 1985, and December 31, 1999.  Our data source is the Thomson Financial Database, 
a private commercial dataset on securities issues that provides, among other information, date of 
issuance, yield to maturity, credit rating, size, maturity and issuer’s sector of economic activity, 
                                                           
18 Results apply to Japan before the Second World War, when commercial and investment banking were not 
separated. 14
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and is compiled from regulatory filings, news sources, company press releases, and 
prospectuses.  
Information on defaults is from Moody’s Corporate Default Risk Service Database, 
which includes global comprehensive information on defaults since 1970 for 11,000 corporate 
and sovereign entities. The data is derived from Moody’s own proprietary database and is 
updated on a monthly basis. Our sample consists of defaults between January 1985 and 
December 2008. In total, 356 nonconvertible bonds in our sample defaulted. While some of 
them were issued by the same company, not all security issues by the same firm were 
underwritten by the same syndicate, justifying their inclusion in the analysis as distinct events. 
Missed interest or principal payments made up the majority of defaults. Less frequent reasons of 
default are filing for Chapter 11, filing for bankruptcy, distressed exchange and grace period 
default.  
As opposed to underwritings from investment houses, we define bank underwritings as 
those by one of the subsidiaries (so called “Section 20” subsidiaries) of commercial banks (i.e. 
deposit-taking institutions with access to deposit insurance).
19  
For the empirical analysis we exclude the period before 1991, when the number of 
issues underwritten by banks was insignificant. In total, we have a sample of 3,943 fixed-rate 
corporate bonds issued between 1991 and 1999, 842 underwritten by Section 20 subsidiaries 
(21.4 per cent; 28.9 per cent in dollar terms) and 3,101 underwritten by investment houses. 
Banks’ share in the underwritings’ business changed significantly over the 1990’s. In dollar 
terms, it rose from 18.2 per cent in 1991, to 42.9 per cent in 1995, and declined again to 35.4 per 
cent in 1999. 
The default rate is significantly higher for bonds underwritten by banks than for 
investment houses, both in terms of dollar and number of issues. The average default rate for 
issues underwritten by banks is 11.9 per cent (10.3 in dollar terms), compared to 8.3 per cent for 
investment houses (7.6 percent in dollar terms, showing that defaulted issues underwritten by 
investment houses have a smaller size than their average issue). This difference is particularly 
striking for lower-grade bonds – i.e., those rated Baa2 and below – while it has the opposite sign 
for higher-grade securities. Of the 1,995 lower-grade issues in our sample (Table 1), 1,522 were 
underwritten by investment houses and 473 by commercial banks (Table 2). The rate of default 
of issues underwritten by investment houses is 12.8 percent, much lower than the 18.2 per cent 
of those underwritten by banks.  
                                                           
19 The Federal Reserve Board granted approval to a bank holding company to engage through a so-called Section 20 
subsidiary in underwriting and dealing in securities that a member bank may not underwrite or deal in directly.  Such 
a subsidiary is called a Section  20 subsidiary in reference to a section of the Glass-Steagall Act that limited 
affiliations between certain securities companies and member banks. The list of Section 20 subsidiaries is from 
Cornett et al. (2002). 15
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Another striking difference is between the performance of bonds issued in the first and 
in the second part of our sample period, possibly due to the different macroeconomic conditions. 
Securities issued between 1991 and 1994 show a rate of default of 11.4 per cent, while those 
underwritten between 1995 and 1999 only have a rate of default of 7.3. Securities underwritten 
by banks had a much higher rate of default than those underwritten by investment houses (Table 
1). The fact that the differences in the ex-post performance of securities issued by banks and 
investment houses is larger for lower-grade securities is consistent with both the conflict of 
interest and the “risk underestimation hypothesis”. That is, due to increased competition 
commercial banks lowered underwriting standards to attain market share or simply due to their 
lower credit assessment abilities, looser standards were “ex-ante” underestimated by investors. 
However, the fact that the difference is lower in the second part of our sample period, when 
banks had already gained market shares in the underwriting business and were likely to be more 
cautious due to reputational issues, is more supportive of the risk underestimation hypothesis.
20 
Table 2 provides some additional evidence consistent with the risk underestimation 
hypothesis, showing that the difference in the default rates of securities underwritten by banks 
and investment houses is much starker for the sub-sample of competitive issues (i.e., those made 
by issuers which used both banks and investment houses as underwriters during our sample 
period; Kang and Liu, 2007).
21 If the reason for the higher default rate of bank underwritten 
issues were conflicts of interest, we would expect that banks push especially the securities 
issued by their longer term borrowers, for which they have most likely obtained through time a 
reliable set of soft information, but that are less likely to switch underwriter from banks to 
investment houses. In the next Section we present the results of a more formal analysis of the 
default probability of securities underwritten by investment houses and commercial banks. 
 
V.  Regression results 
V.a  Baseline specification 
Our basic specification brings back the empirical methods used to analyze the pre-Glass-
Steagall era. Hence we start by building on the model by Kroszner and Rajan (1994) and test 
whether securities underwritten by commercial banks’ subsidiaries have a higher ex-post 
probability of default than those underwritten by investment houses. We start by estimating the 
following binary choice model, using a probit specification: 
 
                                                           
20 Our data set includes relatively few instances of securities underwritten by banks that were at the same time 
lending to the issuers on the syndicated loan market. When excluding these issues, the patterns in the default rates of 
securities underwritten by banks and investment houses remain the same described above, proving that conflicts of 
interest cannot be taken as their unique explanation. 
21  Earlier literature shows that borrowers issuing securities tend often to hire the same investment bank often 
demanding exclusivity in the bond market (Yasuda (2005)) and to lesser extent in the equity market (Ljungqvist, 
Marston, and Wilhelm (2006)) 16
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Pr (Yi,j,t = k) = f (Xi,t, Dj, Zi, Tt), k = 0, 1;   (1) 
 
where: Yi,j,t = 1 if security issue i underwritten by bank j at time t defaulted before maturity and 
Yi,j,t = 0 otherwise; Xi,t are characteristics of the issue i at time t (i.e., size, rating, maturity, gross 
spread over benchmark, issuer’s sector of economic activity); Dj is a dummy taking the value of 
1 if there is at least one Section 20 subsidiary among the banks leading the underwriting 
syndicate; Zi is a set of dummies for the sector of economic activity of the issuer; Tt are year 
dummies. Unlike Kroszner and Rajan (1994), we also include information on the issue’s gross 
spread, to account for a higher probability of default known to investors at the time of the issue 
but not included on the rating and other issue characteristics.
22 All standard errors are calculated 
using the procedure of White (1980) to correct for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the issuer 
level to account for the fact that the behaviors of bonds issued by the same borrower are not 
independent. 
Panel A of Table 3 reports the results of the estimation of the basic specification for 
equation (1). The regression includes time and industry dummies, as well as the issue’s size, 
gross spread with respect to the benchmark, maturity and rating. Estimates are conducted on a 
sample of 3,279 security issues, from 1991 to 1999.
23 
The coefficient of the dummy variable for issues underwritten by commercial banks is 
consistent with the hypothesis that securities issues underwritten by commercial banks have a 
higher probability of default. That is, on average, issues underwritten by commercial banks have 
a higher probability of underwriting a security that eventually went into default. This result 
reinforces what was already apparent from the descriptive statistics, since the higher default 
probability is confirmed also after controlling for the characteristics of the deal, issuer and 
macroeconomic characteristics. The additional controls show that the size of the issue has no 
impact on its default probability. On the contrary, securities with higher yields have a higher 
default probability, even after controlling for rating and duration. 
In Panel B we have distinguished between high-grade (i.e. low level of credit risk) and 
low-grade (i.e. higher level of credit risk) securities, including an interaction term. High-grade 
ratings are those classified by Moody’s between Aaa and Baa1. Low-grade ratings are those 
classified by Moody’s as Baa2 and below. The coefficient of the interaction term between the 
dummy for banks and that for lower-grade securities is positive, significantly different from 
zero, and relatively large. On the contrary, the coefficient of the interaction term between the 
dummy for banks and that for higher-grade securities is negative, but it is not statistically 
                                                           
22 Identical results are obtained excluding the gross return from the set of the explanatory variables. 
23 Of the total number of issues in the period (3,943; Table 1), 308 observations are dropped because we do not have 
any defaults for issues with a rating Aaa, Aa1 and Aa2, Ca, Caa2 and not rated, while 337 are dropped because we do 
not have defaults for firms with one-digit SIC code 6, i.e. firms operating in regulated industries. 17
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significant. The main results are therefore driven by differences in credit screening abilities on 
the underwriting of corporate bonds with relatively high levels of credit risk (i.e. lower ratings). 
 
V.b  Alternative econometric specifications 
In addition to the binary choice model presented above, we checked the robustness of our results 
using two alternative econometric specifications.  
First, in order to account more carefully for the different duration of the bonds linked to 
the credit worthiness of each bond, we estimate a survival model by the method of proportional 
hazards regression first proposed by Cox (1972): 
 
() () () i
T Z D x
i t e t
t i i i
0
' λ λ
ξ δ γ β + + + − =   (2) 
   
where: λ0 is the ‘baseline’ hazard and all other explanatory variables are as indicated above. For 
defaulted bonds, we define the duration as the period from the date of issuance to the date of 
default; for non-defaulted bonds, as the period from the date of issuance to the date of 
repayment. As before, the specification includes, as deal control variables, issue’s maturity, 
rating, size and gross spread with respect to the benchmark as well as time and issuer’s industry 
dummies. 
The results for the coefficient of the dummy for securities underwritten by banks 
reported in Panels C and D of Table 3 confirm the results obtained with the binary choice 
model. Similarly, they also confirm that the overall impact comes from the performance of low-
rated securities (Panel D). The impact of the control variables are also unchanged. 
Second, to correct for the possible bias induced by the use of a parametric specification 
of the probability of default linked to differences in the composition of the selected populations 
of deals according to the type of underwriter biasing our results, we adopt a propensity score 
matching method (Rubin, 1979).
24 In practice, we split our sample between bonds underwritten 
by banks (‘treated’ observations) and bonds underwritten by investment houses (‘untreated’ or 
‘control’ observations), match each ‘treated’ observation with a set of ‘untreated’ observations 
chosen so as to be as similar as possible to the ‘untreated’ ones and then compare the probability 
of default between the two groups. The matching is based on the propensity score estimated 
from a first stage binary choice model using size, rating, maturity, gross spread over the 
benchmark and issuer’s sector of economic activity as explanatory variables. The nearest 
neighbors approach is used.
25  
                                                           
24 These methods, first introduced in the medical sciences, are now becoming increasingly popular also in economics. 
They lend themselves naturally to our analysis, because they focus precisely on non-random selection. For a recent 
survey, see Blundell and Costa Dias (2002). The routine we used for estimations is PSMATCH2, a Stata module by 
Leuven and Sianesi (2003). For an early application to finance see Villalonga (2004).  
25 We found similar results using the kernel weights method suggested by Heckman et al. (1997). 18
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Panel A of Table 4 shows that the probability of default  for securities underwritten by 
Section 20 subsidiaries (the ‘average treatment on the treated’ in the column labeled ‘treated’) is 
larger than for securities underwritten by investment banks (the ‘average treatment on the 
treated’ in the column labeled ‘controls’) and the difference is statistically significant.
26 Even 
stronger results are obtained for low-grade (i.e. with higher credit risk) securities, but the 
difference between the two effects is not statistically significant (panel B). Finally, for higher-
grade (i.e. low credit risk) securities (panel C), the average treatment effect for ‘treated’ 
observations is equal to 0.04, which is almost double than for the control sample (0.023), and it 
is statistically significant. 
 
V.c  Discussion 
In summary, the results obtained with all three statistical methodologies presented above lend 
strong support to the view that securities underwritten by the commercial bank securities 
subsidiaries have a higher probability of default than those underwritten by investment houses. 
This is in contrast with the certification hypothesis, according to which commercial banks are 
able to screen credit quality relatively better than other institutions before passing the 
underwritten securities through to investors.  
Our results are consistent with findings of Kang and Liu (2007), who do not find a 
certification view of bank underwriters. Instead they show that banks that are more rapidly 
expanding their underwriting business face a greater need to provide investors with high-reward 
investment opportunities and discount the prices of bonds in order to attract potential investors 
They are also related to those by Ber et al. (2001), who suggest that that fund managers 
are able to find and to exploit “naïve” or “unsuspecting” retail investors who are not able to 
distinguish and fully price ex-ante the impact of institutional underwriting (i.e. whether the 
securities were underwritten by banks or investment houses) on ex-post credit quality.  
However, the baseline results presented above provide no clear explanation of the 
reasons why securities underwritten by banks are ex-post more likely to default than those 
underwritten by investment houses. In particular, it is not clear whether this depends on the 
presence of conflicts of interests or on other reasons leading banks to underestimate credit risk. 
In the following, we discuss some possible alternative explanations of our results, by delving 





                                                           
26 Standard errors are computed by bootstrapping with 200 repetitions and significance by using the bias-corrected 
confidence interval. 19
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VI.  Additional evidence 
VI.a  Ex-post defaults 
As it was already apparent from the descriptive statistics, the difference between the 
probabilities of default of securities underwritten by banks and investment houses is more 
striking in the first part of our sample period, a result leading support to the risk underestimation 
hypothesis.  
In Table 5 we split our sample between issues underwritten between 1991 and 1994 and 
those underwritten between 1995 and 1999. Consistent with the evidence reported in the 
descriptive statistics, the coefficient of the dummy for issues underwritten by banks stronger 
when estimated in the first part of our sample (Panel A), but it becomes statistically insignificant 
when estimated in the second part of the sample (Panel B). Further, Panel D and E confirm that 
also in this case the results are driven by the differences in credit screening abilities on the 
underwriting of corporate bonds with relatively high level of credit risk (i.e. lower ratings). 
These results suggest that, initially, the banks that were entering the underwriting business 
underestimated the credit risk of the more opaque securities (i.e., those with lower credit 
ratings). Since we control for rating in our regressions, risk underestimation took place within 
each rating bucket, and for given size and maturity. Ex-post, risk underestimation led to the 
higher default incidence of securities underwritten by banks. In the second part of our sample 
period, when banks had already gained a significant share of the market and reputational issues 
might have become more compelling, relative risk underestimation nearly disappeared.  
Evidence obtained from splitting the sample in two periods might also consistent with 
the conflicts of interest hypothesis, if one assumes that banks initially underwrote securities for 
the borrowers that they knew best, for which the potential for conflicts of interest was stronger, 
and only later offered their services to a wider clientele.  
To contrast this explanation we have further focused on a sub-sample of competitive 
issues, defined as those made by issuers that used both banks and investment houses as 
underwriters during our sample period (Kang and Liu, 2007). On one hand, it is more likely that 
banks take an aggressive strategy to gain new clients from investment houses within the group 
of more competitive issues, possibly requiring lower yields and therefore underpricing risk. On 
the other hand, it is less likely that banks have strong informational advantages with respect to 
investment houses on these issuers, since these clients are less reliant on strong relationships 
with a given financial intermediary. Finding that competitive issues underwritten by banks have 
a higher default incidence than those underwritten by investment house would therefore provide 
additional support to the risk underestimation hypothesis, in contrast to the conflict of interest 
hypothesis. 
Table 6 shows that this is indeed the case. The coefficient of the dummy for bank 
underwriting in the sub-sample of competitive issues is positive and strongly significant (Panel 20
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A), which is not the case for uncompetitive issues (Panel B). Panels D and E confirm once again 
that the general results are driven by the differences in credit screening standards or abilities on 
the underwriting of corporate bonds with relatively high level of credit risk (i.e. lower ratings). 
Table 7 provides some additional results consistent with the risk underestimation and 
competition on “de novo” entrants hypotheses, showing that foreign banks, that are more likely 
to incur in risk underestimation or in a looser underwriting standards to gain market shares, have 
a much higher probability of underwriting securities that ex-post defaulted (Panel A). 
Panel B looks instead at the impact of maturity at issuance on debt defaults and bank 
underwritings. In this respect, the literature emphasizes that under information asymmetry, 
credit quality of the issuer influences debt maturity (see Flannery, 1986, and Berger et al., 
2005). Firms with lower credit quality are more likely to be forced by the market to issue short-
term debt, to minimize moral hazard problems, while firms with higher credit quality would 
tend to issue long-term debt. Consistent this prediction, we find that the dummy for short term 
(below 5 years) securities underwritten by banks is significant, while that for longer term 
securities (above 10 years) was statistically insignificant. Also in this case, the evidence seems 
in contrast with the conflicts of interest hypothesis between underwriters and investors, since 
banks would be more willing to push longer-term low-quality securities to investors, gaining 
more time to recover their risky lending expositions. 
 
VI.b  Ex-ante conditions 
In a seminal contribution, Gande et al. (1997) found that interest rates on securities underwritten 
by banks were significantly lower than those on securities underwritten by investment houses, a 
result providing strong evidence in favor of the certification hypothesis. While our results on ex-
post defaults are clearly at odds with such hypothesis, it might still be the case that investors 
believed in banks’ superior certification ability, and therefore accepted lower returns on the 
securities that they underwrote. Banks might have then exploited the investors’ belief of their 
superior certification ability, and required lower interest rates on the issues that they 
underwrote, in order to attract new issuers. 
We have tested this hypothesis verifying if the gross spread on securities underwritten 
by banks is significantly different from that on securities underwritten by investment houses, 
controlling for all the characteristics of the issue considered in the previous regressions. Table 8 
shows that this is not the case (Panel A), neither distinguishing the effect on high-grade and 
low-grade securities (Panel B).
27 Interestingly, securities underwritten by foreign banks are 
instead required to pay a premium to investors (Panel C), although we already know from our 
previous analysis on the probability of default that this is insufficient to compensate for their 
                                                           
27 Roten and Mullineaux (2002) find similar results analyzing a different sample than Gande et al. (1997). 21
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higher riskiness, because in those regressions we did control also for the gross yield on the 
bond, and still estimated a positive and significant coefficient for the dummy of foreign banks. 
Next, we ran a counterfactual exercise verifying if ex-ante spreads charged on those 
securities that eventually defaulted were higher than average. Effectively this would detect 
whether the market had some information on the credit risk which was included in the spreads 
but is not captured by our controls. Interesting, we find that this is indeed the case, as shown by 
the positive and significant coefficient of the dummy for issues that eventually defaulted (Panel 
D). However, this effect is common to all issues underwritten by both banks and investment 
houses, as shown by the insignificant coefficient of the term accounting for the set of defaulted 
issues underwritten by a Section 20 subsidiary.  
 
VI.c  Further controls 
In a number of unreported regressions, available from the authors upon request, we have also 
checked some additional implications of the conflicts of interest and the risk underestimation 
hypotheses. First, we matched our information with those on syndicated lending obtained from 
Loanware, a commercial database provided by Dealogic, and we have singled the cases in 
which banks had an ongoing lending relationship at the time of the issue or had had one in the 
previous years but we do not find evidence suggesting that earlier lending relationships had an 
impact on our results.  
Second, we verified if issues underwritten by banks were ex-ante riskier than those 
underwritten by investment houses, estimating a binary choice model for the probability that a 
security is underwritten by a bank. A possible explanation for the higher default rate on issues 
underwritten by banks – particularly for lower quality deals – is that the ratings assigned to 
those securities were systematically different from those of bonds underwritten by investment 
houses. This might happen for two different reasons, both assuming that commercial banks are 
unable to gather all the information necessary to fully discriminate between different securities. 
On the one hand, rating agencies might assume that commercial banks have an incentive to 
lower their screening incentives when underwriting securities. For instance, they might assume 
that there is an ex-ante conflict of interest and that some banks might misrepresent the issues’ 
quality to sell it to unsuspecting investors. In this case, they would tend to assign de facto an 
inferior rating to bonds originated by commercial banks. In other words, rating agencies would 
apply a ‘lemon’ discount to issues underwritten by banks (Kroszner and Rajan, 1994). 
Alternatively, rating agencies might assign better ratings to securities underwritten by Section 
20 subsidiaries of commercial banks because they believe that, on average, commercial banks 
are simply better at screening credit risk than investment houses, because they have private 
information on the issuer, as suggested by the certification effect. 22
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1287
January 2011
Clearly a ‘lemon’ discount on bank-originated issues would not imply a bias in our 
results.
28 This, however, would not hold if the rating assignment process assumed the existence 
of a certification effect on the part of commercial banks. Under this second hypothesis, other 
things being equal, bank-originated securities would then be assigned better ratings than those 
originated by investment houses. Lower-grade issues underwritten by commercial banks would 
then be of relatively lower quality and, as such, would have a higher default rate. However, we 
found evidence against this hypothesis, since all the dummies rating buckets in the model 
estimating the probability that an issue is underwritten by a bank or by an investment house are 
statistically insignificant, suggesting that banks are not more likely to underwrite riskier 
securities than investment houses. 
Third, following Gande et al. (1997), we used the residuals from the binary choice 
model on the probability that a security is underwritten by a commercial bank as a proxy for 
underwriters’ private information, and we plugged them into our baseline specification for the 
probability of default. Their effect is statistically insignificant, suggesting that neither banks nor 
security houses made intentional use of private information, neither for certification purposes 
nor to exploit potential conflicts of interest. 
Fourth, we verified if the progressive entry of banks in the security business affected the 
default rates. Since in all our previous specifications we included year dummies among the 
explanatory variables, we replaced them with the aggregate market share of banks in security 
underwriting. Our results remained unchanged. 
Fifth, we checked whether the interest rates on bank underwritten securities were 
significantly lower from the averages for the subsamples of competitive issues, lower-grade 
issues, and issues underwritten before 1995, as it might have been the case if banks had 
purposely tried to use their market power to place bonds at lower prices, to gain market shares 
among issuers. In none of these cases the difference was statistically significant.  
 
VII.  Conclusions 
Our results show that securities underwritten by banks have a significantly higher default rate 
than those underwritten by investment houses, and that this cannot be explained by ex-ante 
publicly available information on the characteristics of the issues or the issuers. This result is in 
contrast with the certification hypothesis, stating that banks benefit from informational 
economies of scope and therefore can assess more precisely the riskiness of the securities that 
they underwrite.  
                                                           
28 In presence of a ‘lemons market’ discount, affiliate-originated issues would be systematically rated lower than 
issues underwritten by commercial banks and therefore, within each rating class, they should have on average a lower 
probability of default (see Kroszner and Rajan, 1994, pp. 822-823). 23
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We have proposed two alternative explanations of our findings. First, following the very 
rationale for the Glass-Steagall Act, we posited that banks might exploit their private 
information and misrepresent the issues’ quality to sell it to unsuspecting investors, possibly 
using the proceedings to pay back their own loans. However, we found no convincing evidence 
consistent with this hypothesis.  
Second, we suggested that banks might have been induced to underestimated default 
risk in their search for market shares. We found evidence consistent with this hypothesis, 
especially for securities that were low-graded, issued by corporations that more aggressively 
searched for better conditions, and in the first years since the admission of banks into the 
security business. In other words, banks had to be initially more aggressive than investment 
banks houses in order to gain market share, and in pursuing this objective they might have 
loosened their credit standards excessively. 
The recent crisis has revived the interest on the possible impact of the repeal of the 
Glass-Steagall Act on banks’ incentives. Our results do not question the elimination of the 
barriers between investment and commercial banking proposed by the Glass-Steagall Act. 
Rather, they point to the possibly perverse effects of allowing for increased competition without 
complementing it with more intensive scrutiny at the supervisory level.  
Partly due to de-regulation and partly due to financial innovation, the traditional bank 
lending and securities business have become increasingly intertwined (Thakor and Boot, 2009) 
and a number of investment banks have become systemic in nature. Hence further empirical 
evidence on the competitive dynamics in the investment banking business and its possible 
impact on risk-taking incentives is, to our mind, warranted. In particular, it would be interesting 
to know whether a more crowded market for investment bank business – including universal 
banks with access to deposits and central banking facilities – might impact banks’ risk taking 
incentives. At the same time, it would be relevant to understand how commercial banks further 
involvement in securities business might be affecting their broad credit screening intensity in 
traditional lending activities.     24
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Table 1  
Number and volume of securities issued by year, by type of underwriter and by default 
The table gives the number and the total aggregate values of the securities in our sample. They are issued between January 1, 1991 and 
December 31, 1999, with maturity longer than December 31, 1999. It also includes the default rates in percentage of those securities 
according to whether they were underwritten by investment houses or commercial banks. Commercial bank underwritings are those by 
one of the Section 20 subsidiaries. Data on security issues are from the Thomson Financial Database, defaults are from Moody’s 
Default Report. High-grade ratings are those classified by Moody’s between Aaa and Baa1. Low-grade ratings are those classified by 
Moody’s as Baa2 and below.   
 
 
Total market   





          Investment 


















Panel A: Total securities issued 
 
1985  81  11,460           32.1 26.3       
1986  289  43,633           17.6 15.6       
1987  195  50,122           23.1 31.5       
1988  150  37,977           14.7 12.6       
1989 139  41,146      2.2 0.8   15.4 10.3      
1990 104  21,061      1.9 4.4   3.9 4.2      
1991 259  57,740      13.5 18.2   4.5 4.2   8.6  11.3
1992 464  106,011      23.9 31.1   12.2 10.5   14.4  9.6
1993 624  156,595      25.3 29.2   11.2 9.4   14.6  14.7
1994 301  64,763      31.2 40.5   11.1 9.7   19.1  24.5
1995 329  84,394      42.9 49.5   8.0 7.8   7.1  4.3
1996 411  113,820      23.8 25.4   7.3 5.7   13.3  17.7
1997 321  115,048      16.5 22.0   4.9 3.7   9.4  5.0
1998 630  202,796      7.8 15.0   5.7 3.0   6.1  9.8
1999 604  275,378      17.1 35.4   8.8 12.8   8.7  6.4
                                 
91-99 3,943  1,176,544      21.4 28.9   8.3 7.6   11.9  10.3
                               
85-90  958  205,400     0.5 0.6   17.7 17.4     
91-94  1,648  385,109     24.2 30.0   10.2 8.8    15.1  15.1
95-99 2,295  791,435    19.3 28.3 6.9 7.0   9.0  7.8
 
Panel B: High grade securities 
 
85-90  481  86,522     0.8 1.3   4.4 4.1     
91-94  828  193,209     19.2 22.0   3.3 3.5    1.3  4.5
95-99 1,120  414,865    18.8 32.1 4.3 4.0   5.7  4.4
91-99 1,948  608,073    18.9 28.9 3.9 3.8   3.8  4.5
 
Panel C: Low grade securities 
 
85-90  477  118,878     0.2 0.1   31.1 26.9     
91-94  820  191,901     29.1 38.0   18.2 15.6    24.3  21.4
95-99 1,175  376,570    19.9 24.1 9.5 9.8   12.0  12.6
91-99 1,995  568,471    23.7 28.8 12.8 11.5   18.2  16.5
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Table 3  
Effect of type of underwriter on security defaults 
Panels A and B presents the results of probit regressions of the probability of default of securities underwritten by 
investment houses and commercial banks, where the dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the 
security defaults (equation 1 in the text). Panels C and D present hazard ratios. They are the results of a survival-time 
data model by the method of proportional hazards regression developed by Cox (1972), where the dependent variable is 
the ‘baseline’ hazard based on the duration measured in months (equation 2 in the text). For defaulted bonds the 
duration is the period from the date of issuance to the date of default. For non-defaulted bonds the duration is the period 
from the date of issuance to the date of repayment. Time and industry dummies are included, although not reported. 
Data sources for each variable are described in the notes to tables 1 and 2. High-grade ratings (i.e. HI-grade) are those 
classified by Moody’s as having rating included between Aaa and Baa1. Low-grade ratings (i.e. LO-grade) are those 
classified by Moody’s as Baa2 and below. Bank underwritings are those by one of the Section 20 subsidiaries listed in 
Cornett et al. (2002). Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the issuer level are reported in parentheses. 
The symbol *** indicates a significance level of 1 per cent or less; ** between 1 and 5 per cent; * between 5 and 10 per 
cent.  
 
Panel A:  Panel B:  Panel C:    Panel D: 
Variables  Probit    Probit  Cox  Cox 
         
 Bank Underwriting  0.201 *   1.389  **       
  (0.111)     (0.226)        
              
Bank Underwriting *  HI-grade    -0.022         0.876    
   (0.210)        (0.335)  
 Bank Underwriting * LO-grade    0.279 **       1.545 ** 
    (0.130)        (0.284)  
            
 Size (log value)  0.022    0.026    1.046      1.054   
  (0.054)   (0.054)  (0.094)     (0.093)  
            
 Gross spread  0.002 *** 0.002 *** 1.004  ***    1.004 ***
  (0.001)  (0.001)   (0.001)      (0.001)  
            
      
 No. of  Observations  3,279 3,279 3,569      3,569
 R-Square  0.273 0.274     
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Table 4  
Effect of type of underwriter on security defaults – Matching model 
The table presents the results of a matching logit regressions of the probability of default of securities underwritten by  
investment  houses  and  commercial  banks  (equation  3  in  the  text),  splitting  the  sample  by  year  of  issue.  The 
routine used  for  estimations  is  PSMATCH2,  a  Stata  module  developed by  Leuven  and  Sianesi.  (2003). The 
dependent variable is a dummy taking the value of 1 if the security defaults and 0 otherwise. The sources of the variable 
are described in the notes to tables 1 and 2. High-grade (i.e. HI-Grade) ratings are those classified between Aaa and 
Baa1 by Moody’s. Low-grade ratings (i.e. LO-grade) are those classified by Moody’s as Baa2 and below. Bank 
underwritings   included as “treated” observations are those by one of the Section 20 subsidiaries listed in Cornett et al. 
(2002). The regression also includes calendar year, industry and rating dummies (not reported). Standard errors 
(reported in parentheses) are computed by bootstrapping, with 200 repetitions. The symbol *** indicates a significance 
level of 1 per cent or less; ** between 1 and 5 per cent; * between 5 and 10 per cent. 
 
Panel A: All Securities 
Variables Treated    Controls  Difference 
Average treatment effect on the treated  0.135 0.107    0.028** 
       (0.014)  
   
No. of  Obs. (common support)  3,024 741  
No. of  Observations  3,049 747  
 
 
Panel B: LO-Grade Securities 
Variables Treated    Controls    Difference 
Average treatment effect on the treated   0.225 0.189    0.036 
       (0.025) 
   
No. of  Obs. (common support)  1,311 382  
No. of  Observations  1,370 388  
 
 
Panel C: HI-Grade Securities 
Variables Treated    Controls  Difference 
Average treatment effect on the treated   0.040 0.023    0.018* 
       (0.013) 
   
No. of  Obs. (common support)  1,643 349  
No. of  Observations  1,657 359  
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Table 5 
Effect of type of underwriter on security defaults – Split by sample period  
 
Panel A reports the results of estimating the probit specification (equation 1 in the text) separating the bonds issued between 1991-94, 
while Panel B reports the results of estimating the probit specification (equation 1 in the text ) separating the bonds issued between 
1995-99. The column Difference test is the value of a test for the hypothesis that the coefficients of the regression are equal for the 
two subsamples, that is distributed as a χ
2 with 1 degree of freedom. Data sources for each variable are described in the notes to 
tables 1 and 2. High-grade ratings (i.e. HI-grade) are those classified by Moody’s as having rating included between Aaa and Baa1. 
Low-grade ratings (i.e. LO-grade) are those classified by Moody’s as Baa2 and below. Bank underwritings are those by one of the 
Section 20 subsidiaries listed in Cornett et al. (2002). Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the issuer level are 
reported in parentheses. The symbol *** indicates a significance level of 1 per cent or less; ** between 1 and 5 per cent; * between 5 
and 10 per cent. 
 






   
1995-99 
 
  Difference test 
(first vs. second period) 
        
Bank Underwriting   0.264 *  0.106      0.56  
 (0.152)   (0.163)    
Size (log value)  -0.031    0.093      1.08  
  (0.098)  (0.069)    
Gross spread  0.003 ***  0.002 ***    0.66  
  (0.001)  (0.001)      
      
No. of  observations  1,238 1,783   










   
1995-99 
 
  Difference test 
(first vs. second period) 
        
Bank Underwriting *  HI-grade   -0.365    0.142      1.97  
  (0.380)  (0.259)    
Bank Underwriting * LO-grade  0.403 **  0.087      1.60  
  (0.172)  (0.198)    
Size (log value)  -0.028    0.092      0.99  
  (0.099)  (0.069)    
Gross spread  0.003 ***  0.002 ***    0.68  
  (0.001)  (0.001)     
      
No. of  observations  1,238 1,783    
R-Square 0.282 0.352  
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Table 6 
Effect of type of underwriter on security defaults – Split by type of issuer 
 
Panels A and B report the results of estimating the probit specification (equation 1) of the paper separating the bond issues between 
competitive (those whose issuers have issued at least one bond underwritten by both investment houses and banks during the sample 
period) and uncompetitive. The column Difference test is the value of a test for the hypothesis that the coefficients of the regression 
are equal for the two subsamples. Data sources for each variable are described in the notes to tables 1 and 2. High-grade ratings (i.e. 
HI-grade) are those classified by Moody’s as having rating included between Aaa and Baa1. Low-grade ratings (i.e. LO-grade) are 
those classified by Moody’s as Baa2 and below. Bank underwritings are those by one of the Section 20 subsidiaries listed in Cornett 
et al. (2002). Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the issuer level are reported in parentheses. The symbol *** 
indicates a significance level of 1 per cent or less; ** between 1 and 5 per cent; * between 5 and 10 per cent. 
 











          
Bank Underwriting   0.509 ***  0.068    4.10 ** 
  (0.136)   (0.170)      
Size (log value)  -0.009    0.185 ***  2.93 * 
  (0.090)   (0.069)      
Gross spread  0.001    0.003 ***  1.52   
  (0.001)   (0.001)     
      
No. of  observations  1,068 1,923    
















          
Bank Underwriting *  HI-grade  0.151    -0.185    0.39   
  (0.215)  (0.499)      
Bank Underwriting * LO-grade  0.733 ***  0.110    5.81 ** 
  (0.183)  (0.183)      
Size (log value)  -0.008    0.191 ***  3.02 * 
  (0.091)  (0.070)      
Gross spread  0.001    0.003 ***  1.77   
  (0.001) (0.001)     
      
No. of  observations  1,068 1,923    
R-Square 0.286 0.335  
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Table 7 
Effect of Type of Underwriter on Security Defaults – Foreign banks and maturity 
Panel A disentangles deals underwritten by foreign banks. Panel B describes the effect of maturity at issuance on 
defaults, including interaction terms for short (below 5 years), and long-term securities. For all panels the dependent 
variable is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the security defaults (equation 1 in the text). Time, industry, maturity 
and rating dummies are included, although not reported. Variable sources are described in the notes to tables 1 and 2. 
Bank underwritings are those by one of the Section 20 subsidiaries listed in Cornett et al. (2002). Heteroskedasticity 
robust standard errors clustered at the issuer level are reported in parentheses. The symbol *** indicates a significance 
level of 1 per cent or less; ** between 1 and 5 per cent; * between 5 and 10 per cent. 
 
   Panel A:     Panel B: 
   Variables  Foreign 
 
Maturity 
          
Bank Underwriting  0.188 *       
  (0.113)        
Bank underwriting * Foreign banks  0.995 ***       
  (0.202)        
          
Bank Underwriting * short term        0.317 *** 
        (0.120)  
Bank Underwriting * long term        0.003    
        (0.166)  
          
Size (log value)  0.052     0.021    
  (0.051)      (0.055)  
Gross spread  0.002 ***    0.002 *** 
  (0.001)     (0.001)  
            
No. of  Observations  3,279      3,279   
R-Square 0.286      0.274   
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Table 8 
Effect of Type of Underwriter and deal characteristics on Spreads 
Panels A to D present the results of the regressions of the regressions on the gross spreads of the security at issuance with 
respect to the benchmark  with the probabilities of being underwritten by a bank (i.e. bank underwriting, dummy equal 1) 
or by investment houses (dummy equal 0). Maturity dummies for short, medium and long term maturity refer to 
maturities at issuance of below 5, between 5 and 10 and above 10 years respectively. High-grade ratings are those 
classified by Moody’s between Aaa and Baa1. Low-grade ratings are those classified by Moody’s as Baa2 and below. 
The dummies defaulted refers to all securities than eventually defaulted. Time, industry and rating dummies are included 
where applicable, although not reported. Variable sources are described in the notes to tables 1 and 2. Bank underwritings 
are those by one of the Section 20 subsidiaries listed in Cornett et al. (2002). Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors 
clustered at the issuer level are reported in parentheses. The symbol *** indicates a significance level of 1 per cent or 
less; ** between 1 and 5 per cent; * between 5 and 10 per cent. 
 
  Panel A    Panel B    Panel C    Panel D 
V a r i a b l e s             
                    
Bank Underwriting  -1.577             -1.565       -2.364    
  (3.242)           (3.236)     (3.098)   
                      
Bank Underwriting * HI-grade        -2.676                
       (2.490)               
                        
Bank Underwriting * LO-grade        0.680               
       (5.668)               
                      
Bank underwriting * Foreign banks              6.951          
            (11.180)       
                    
Defaulted                     28.899  ***
                  (8.862)  
                    
Defaulted * Bank underwriting                    -0.375    
                  (12.483)  
                      
Size (log value)  -0.538       -0.537      -0.400       -0.425    
  (1.334)     (1.335)     (1.357)     (1.358)  
                      
No. of Observations  3,587      3,587      3,587      3,587   
R-Square  0.841     0.841     0.841     0.841  
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